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The objectives of this study are to understand the determinants of reser-
vation wages and measure the gap between reservation and market wages in 
North Macedonia. The study makes use of recently collected information on 
reservation wages in the Labor Force Survey 2016 and 2017. The analysis 
relies on ordinary least squares, propensity score matching, Heckman-cor-
rected estimates, and panel fixed effects. The results suggest that it is mainly 
supply factors that shape reservation wages in the country. Higher education 
achievement sizably increases future wage expectations, while age and longer 
spells of unemployment reduce them. Demand factors are found to be insig-
nificant for reservation wage formation. Observed by skill level, the results 
suggest that low-skilled individuals consistently value their skills higher than 
what the market offers and who set too high expectations. These circumstances 
are aggravated in cases where the household is well-off and/or receives remit-
tances. By contrast, highly skilled individuals, despite maintaining a positive 
reservation wage gap, have a propensity to accept market wages even when 
they fall below their reservation wage, likely because these workers fear rapid 
depreciation of their skills.
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INTRODUCTION
High and potentially downward rigid 
reservation wages – below which unem-
ployed persons would not accept a job – 
may be a key reason for high and persistent 
unemployment rates. North Macedonia’s 
unemployment rate currently stands at 
20.8%, though it has continued to decline 
since its peak of 36% in 2006. The decline 
– especially during the Global Financial 
Crisis - has been mainly driven by the gov-
ernment-supported expansion of foreign 
production capacities in the country and 
frequently generous programs for subsi-
172
Rev. soc. polit., god. 27, br.2, str. 171-192, Zagreb 2020. Petreski M., Oviedo A. M., Cancho C. A.: Expectations Set High:...
dizing employment, though also potential-
ly interfering with the absence of a census 
since 2002 and the accelerated emigration 
from the country since then. The level of 
the unemployment rate in North Macedo-
nia also reflects structural characteristics of 
the labor force: a large share of low-skilled 
job seekers, accompanied by sizable skill 
mismatches, prevents fast and smooth tran-
sition to decent employment. 
Still, the role of reservation wage for 
unemployment should be viewed in at 
least two important aspects. First, there is 
almost no evidence about the trend of res-
ervation wages, nor about the way of their 
formation given personal and labor-market 
circumstances. The reservation wage in na-
tionally representative surveys – like the 
Labor Force Survey – has been included 
only in 2016, making the exploration of the 
job-search relationship between reserva-
tion wage, personal traits and institutional 
aspects (e.g. the generosity of the unem-
ployment benefits) difficult so far. Second, 
despite the level and structural character-
istics of unemployment in the country, the 
decline in a decade has still been sizable.
This paper has two objectives: first, to 
understand the determinants of reservation 
wages in North Macedonia; and second, to 
measure the gap between reservation and 
market wages. Both will enable understand-
ing of the formation of reservation wages 
and its importance for tailoring of policies 
to alleviate its potentially adverse role for 
unemployment. We rely on two years of the 
Labor Force Survey – 2016 and 2017, de-
spite maintaining only a pooled cross-sec-
tion structure due to the short period on dis-
posal. Given the constraints, the approach 
is only exploratory in nature, seeking to re-
veal facts about reservation wages in North 
Macedonia which were either unknown or 
assorted with anecdotal evidence only. 
Results suggest that it is mainly supply 
factors which shape reservation wages in 
the country. Higher education attainment 
sizably increases future wage expecta-
tions, especially when persons are young-
er and with short unemployment spells. 
Then, reservation wage declines with age 
and with longer spells of unemployment. 
On the other hand, the insignificance of 
demand factors for reservation wage for-
mation may suggest that job seekers either 
lack information about local conditions, or 
– more importantly – they are reluctant to 
fast accommodate, considering them sub-
standard. The latter is especially the case 
for low-skilled individuals, who consist-
ently value their skills higher than what the 
market offers and who set too high expec-
tations. On the other hand, highly-skilled 
individuals, despite maintaining a positive 
reservation wage gap, have a propensity to 
accept market wages even when they fall 
below their reservation wage. 
The paper is structured as follows. The 
next section briefly reviews the job search 
theory as the analytical foundation of the 
study. Section 3 presents a few descriptive 
facts about the reservation wages in the 
country. Sections 4 and 5 present the under-
lying methodology and data used, respec-
tively. Section 6 presents and discusses the 
results. Section 7 concludes.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
AND A LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW
The underlying theoretical construct of 
the reservation wage formation is the job 
search theory. We assume that an unem-
ployed person will accept a job offer under 
the following condition:
(1)
Whereby  is the offered wage while  – 
the reservation wage. 
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The probability that the unemployed person receives a wage offer (𝑝𝑝!)  depends on 
both demand and supply factors; the former include the general labor market conditions (e.g. 
companies’ need for workers), while the latter include personal traits like skills, age, gender, 
the unemployment spell etc. This probability is negatively correlated with the level of the 
wage offer: the higher the wage offer, the more candidates it attracts for the job, hence 
lowering individual chances for getting the job. The probability that the person gets the job 
(𝑝𝑝!), which depends on the personal characteristics (𝑍𝑍) and the reservation wage, then, is: 
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!
!!
        (2) 
Whereby 𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤  is the distribution of wages for various job offers, while the other notations 
are the same as before. 
The expected wage of the accepted job offer in the next searching step is: 
𝐸𝐸 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤 ≥ 𝑤𝑤! =
!∙!! !,! ∙! ! !"
!
!!
!! !,! ∙! ! !"
!
!!
       (3) 
For the offer to be accepted, the present values of the accepted wage and of the 
returns to search must be equal. The present value of the reservation wage is given by: 
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The probability that the unemployed 
person receives a wage offer depends on 
both demand and supply factors; the former 
include the general labor market conditions 
(e.g. companies’ need for workers), while 
the latter include personal traits like skills, 
age, gender, the unemployment spell etc. 
This probability is negatively correlated 
with the level of the wage offer: the higher 
the wage offer, the more candidates it at-
tracts for the job, hence lowering individual 
chances for getting the job. The probability 
that the person gets the job  which depends 
on the personal characteristics  and the res-
ervation wage, then, is:
(2)
Whereby  is the distribution of wages for 
various job offers, while the other notations 
are the same as before.
The expected wage of the accepted job 
offer in the next searching step is:
(3)
For the offer to be accepted, the present 
values of the accepted wage and of the re-
turns to search must be equal. The present 
value of the reservation wage is given by:
(4)
If the offer is accepted in period t=1 in-
stead of in t=0, the present value of the next 
research step is given by:
(5)
Whereby u is the received unemploy-
ment benefits and c is the fixed search costs 
born in the previous step. On (5), we add 
the present values of the returns to search, 
and obtain:
(6)
Equating (6) and (4) and solving for 
gives:
(7)
Equation (7) suggests that the reserva-
tion wage increases with the unemployment 
benefit and decreases with the search cost. It 
increases with the wage offer, as well with 
the endowment of personal characteristics.
In the empirical literature, the corpus of 
research of the reservation wage has been 
mainly determined by data availability. 
Studies on the topic exist since the 1980s, 
but mainly on developed economies and 
frequently lacking an extensive temporal 
or even empirical dimension. For example, 
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) only iden-
tify these basic elements of the job search 
theory through theoretical and auxiliary 
restrictions. Some empirically-grounded 
studies for developed countries include: 
Kiefer and Neumann (1979); Franz (1982); 
Lancaster and Chesher (1983); Feldstein 
and Poterba (1984); Maani and Studen-
mund (1986); Jones (1988); Blau (1991); 
Hui (1991); Gorter and Gorter (1993); Ho-
gan (1999); Christensen (2001); Bloemen 
and Stancanelli (2001); Prasad (2003); Ad-
dison et al. (2004; 2009); Shimer and Wer-
ning (2007); Krueger and Mueller (2016); 
Schmieder et al. (2016); Le Barbanchon 
et al. (2019). In general, the empirical lit-
erature is positioned in two strands: i) the 
determinants of reservation wages; and ii) 
the nexus between reservation wages, un-
employment duration and unemployment 
insurance. The first strand documents the 
significance of a set of personal and insti-
tutional characteristics which are relevant 
for the reservation wages in various setups; 
while the second strand documents that 
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both unemployment duration and insurance 
potentially affect the reservation wage, de-
spite the sign and the direction of the cau-
sality in case of the unemployment duration 
has been frequently contested.
DATA
We make use of two yearly waves of the 
Labor Force Survey (LFS), 2016 and 2017. 
We restrict the sample to the working-age 
population, i.e. 15-64. The reservation 
wage, as a survey question, has been asked 
for the first time in 2016. This is advanta-
geous in the sense that this study is the first 
to use this quite new information, though 
disadvantageous in the sense that panel 
structure of our data cannot be imposed, 
despite the fact that LFS – for the rest of the 
variables – has been on disposal since 2006. 
However, each year is composed of four 
quarterly survey waves, providing a total 
of eight periods for analysis. Furthermore, 
however, households are interviewed four 
times at most, every second quarter, and 
then they drop out. This is also a constraint 
for a panel analysis with longer temporal 
structure. The key question pertinent to this 
analysis is: “What is the monthly wage or 
salary which you would accept to work 
for?” to which the respondent could pro-
vide an answer in seven intervals. For our 
analysis, the middle point of the interval is 
taken and hence the variable is treated as 
continuous. The answer has been provided 
only by unemployed persons, i.e. those who 
are without a job and are actively searching 
for one. Annex 1 provides the definitions of 
all variables used throughout.
The following Table 1 provides infor-
mation for our sample. We have on disposal 
10,787 observations of unemployed people 
distributed among 5,955 unique individ-
uals. Out of these, 4,172 observations or 
1,364 unique individuals appear in at least 
two time periods and have both employ-
ment and unemployment experience, so 
that for them we observe both the reserva-
tion and the market wage over a fairly short 
period of time.
STYLIZED FACTS
Reservation wages in North Macedonia 
follow a fairly typical normal-like distribu-
tion (Figure 1). However, compared to mar-
ket wages, the reservation wage distribution 
is considerably narrower and bulged. Still, 
when both are compared in average and me-
dian terms, then no significant differences 
are evident (Table 2). This initial observa-
tion is against the widespread perception 
that reservation wages in North Macedonia 
are frequently set high so that they are an 
obstacle to accepting a job.
The same conclusion could be reached 
if reservation wages are contrasted with 
market wages at the skill level. Figure 2 
reveals that reservation wages grow with 
education, similarly as market wages do. 
In addition, tertiary-educated job seekers 
may be even more rigid in setting their 
expectations higher than what the market 
rewards them. What the figures do not re-
veal, though, is the potential differences – 
in observables and/or unobservables – of 
the employed and unemployed, which is 






appearing at least 
two periods
Unemployed for at 




over the observed period
Observations 69,712 61,112 10,787 4,172
Individuals 31,588 22,988 5,955 1,364
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS.
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Figure 1 
Reservation and market wage distribution
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS. Population weights used accordingly.
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Market wage per hour 93.30 92.74 93.87 79.55 28,995
Reservation wage per hour 90.54 89.90 91.18 79.55 10,195
Ratio of reservation wages to market 
wages 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS. Population weights accordingly used.
Despite the general observation that res-
ervation and market wages in North Mac-
edonia do not significantly differ, still the 
process of reservation wage formation may 
be affected by individual characteristics 
whose role for already employed individ-
uals is either attenuated or does not exist. 
Figure 3 presents simple correlations of 
the reservation wages with the duration of 
the unemployment spell, the household in-
come and the number of children living in 
the household. All three could capture, or 
be related with, the job searching costs. Ap-
parently, the longer spells are related with 
declining reservation wages, while house-
hold income is related with rising reserva-
tion wage. The relation with the number of 
children is not clear-cut.
Similarly, reservation wage formation 
could be affected by demand-side char-
acteristics, prevalently the labor-market 
conditions. Figure 4 presents correlations 
of the reservation wages with the average 
skill- and field-specific unemployment 
rates, per period. Higher reservation wages 
exist in areas where these rates are lower, 
potentially suggesting that the overall pres-
sure existent on the labor market has a role 
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Figure 3  
Reservation wage and some personal characteristics of the unemployed  
 
Figure 3 
Reservation wage and some personal characteristics 
of the unemployed 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS. 
Population weights used accordingly.
Figure 4 
Reservation wage and some labor-market 
characteristics 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS. 
Population weights used accordingly.
 
 
to play for the reservation wage formation 
in North Macedonia. Despite that, this find-
ing may highly interfere with the personal 
skill level and field of education.
In conclusion, reservation wages in 
North Macedonia follow similar, though 
more compressed distribution as market 
wages. However, their formation may be 
interfering with factors which are potential-
ly more relevant for unemployed persons, 
like the searching costs and local employ-
ment conditions.
Figure 2 
Reservation and market wage distribution, by skill level 
               a) Market wages             b) Reservation wages
Source: Authors’ calculations based on LFS. Population weights used accordingly.
Figure 2  
Reservation and market wage distribution, by skill level  
a) Market wages                                                          b) Reservation wages 
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METHODOLOGY 
This paper has dual objectives: i) to ana-
lyze reservation wage determinants; and ii) 
to calculate the reservation wage premium 
or discount. The economic model to analyze 
reservation wage determinants is based on 
the job search theory exposed in Section 2. 
In particular, we convert equation (7) into 
the following estimable form:
(8)
Whereby  is the reservation wage of per-
son i,  is the unemployment benefit, which 
given data constraints are explained below 
and which takes the form of a dummy var-
iable of value 1 if the person is a recipient 
of unemployment benefit and 0 otherwise; 
is the search cost, which is approximat-
ed by the duration of the unemployment 
condition; and  is a vector of observable 
characteristics. Using the unemployment 
benefit as a dummy may be a constraint 
and attenuate significant variability, but the 
LFS does not provide the actual absolute 
number. We divide the observable charac-
teristics on supply and demand factors. The 
supply factors are divided in two groups: 
personal (gender, age, level of education, 
marital status, field of education and sourc-
es of living income: wages and pension 
of other household members, remittance 
receipt, social assistance receipt, income 
from capital) and household (the number of 
children in the household, the total income 
in the household). Marriage and the number 
of children in the household are also used 
as proxies to the search costs. The use of 
the supply-side factors is widespread in 
the literature; see e.g. Hogan (1999). The 
demand factors are captured by defining 
the skill- and field-related unemployment 
rate. Namely, as we observe skills (approx-
imated by 11-level scale of education) and 
field of education (approximated by 11-type 
scale of fields) for both employed and un-
employed persons in our sample, we could 
calculate the skill- and field-specific unem-
ployment rate (per period, where applica-
ble). Both will measure the labor-market 
conditions for the skill- and/or field-niche 
of person i, hence enabling understanding 
of how demand may have shaped the res-
ervation wage. Note that, in order to avoid 
collinearity of the skill- and field-specific 
unemployment rates with the personal lev-
el and field of education, we define them 
through the most disaggregated scale, while 
the personal variables are represented with 
some reasonable aggregation. Moreover, at 
the personal level, both level and field of 
skills are more time invariant (as the ma-
jority of people in the sample would have 
the schooling already finished at the time of 
interview). Franz (1980) discusses the di-
chotomy between supply- and demand-side 
factors.  is the idiosyncratic error which is 
assumed to be well-behaved.
The inclusion of the unemployment 
spell as approximation of the search costs 
may be imprecise for various reasons. For 
instance, search costs may increase as the 
time goes by if the person is pressed by a 
shortage of income for livelihood; howev-
er, they may also be unrelated to the un-
employment duration in case the person 
lives in a household well-endowed with a 
source of income or factors of production. 
The inclusion of the variables on the sourc-
es of livelihood and/or number of children 
should capture this variation. However, still 
the unemployment spell may well capture 
variations other than the search costs, like 
the depletion of human capital, or the learn-
ing of the labor market conditions which 
may lead to changing of the initially set 
reservation wage.
To estimate equation (8), we rely on a 
simple OLS estimation. We pool all unem-
ployed persons over the eight quarters we 
have on disposal, rather than setting a panel. 
We do this because 45% of the unemployed 
10 
In conclusion, reservation wages in North Macedonia follow similar, though more 
compressed distribution as market wages. However, their formation may be interfering with 
factors which are potentially more relevant for unemployed persons, like the searching costs 
and local employment conditions. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
This paper has dual objectives: i) to analyze reservation wage determinants; and ii) to 
calculate the reservation wage premium or discount. The economic model to analyze 
reservation wage determinants is based on th  job search theory exposed in Section 2. In 
particular, we convert equation (7) into the following estimable form: 
𝑤𝑤!,! = 𝛽𝛽! + 𝛽𝛽!𝑢𝑢! + 𝛽𝛽!𝑐𝑐! + 𝛽𝛽!𝑋𝑋!"!!!!! + 𝜀𝜀!      (8) 
Whereby 𝑤𝑤!,! is th  reservation wage of person i, 𝑢𝑢! is the unemployment benefit, which 
given data constraints are explained below and which takes the form of a dummy variable of 
value 1 if the person is a recipient of unemployment benefit and 0 otherwise; 𝑐𝑐! is the search 
cost, which is approximated by the duration of the unemployment condition; and 𝑋𝑋!"!  is a 
vector of observable characteristics. Using the unemployment benefit as a dummy may be a 
strai t attenuate significant variability, but the LFS does not provide the actual 
absolute number. We divide the observable characteristics on supply and demand factors. The 
supply factor  are divided n two groups: personal (gender, age, level of education, marital 
status, field of education and sources of living income: wages and pension of other household 
members, remittance receipt, social assistance receipt, income from capital) and household 
(the number of children in the household, the total income in the household). Marriage and 
the number of children in the household are also used as proxies to the search costs. The use 
f the supply-side factors is widespread in the literature; see e.g. Hogan (1999). The demand 
factors are captured by defining the skill- and field-related unemployment ate. Nam ly, as 
we observe skills (approximated by 11-level scale of education) and field of education 
(approximated by 11-type scale of fields) for both employed and unemployed persons in our 
sample, we could calculate the skill- and ield-specific unemployment rate (per period, where 
applicable). Both will measure the labor-market conditions for the skill- and/or field-niche of 
person i, hence enabling understanding of how demand may have shaped the reservation 
wage. Note that, in order to avoid collinearity of the skill- and field-specific unemployment 
rates with the personal level and field of education, we define them through the most 
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persons appear in our pooled sample only 
once, so that imposing a panel structure 
would not make much sense (see also the 
discussion in Section 3). Therefore, any 
unobserved factor relevant for the reserva-
tion wage (like ability) would remain in the 
error term only. Such factors may interfere 
with the observed factors and caution in the 
interpretation, and from this point of view, 
may be beneficial. On the other hand, how-
ever, having a panel structure would wipe 
out time-invariant indicators; a major part 
of our skill- and field-related education var-
iables, are time invariant, especially given 
we have a span of only two years. We do 
include period-specific dummies, to capture 
general demand trends. The second draw-
back is that through this simple approach 
we may only understand correlations rather 
than causations. Some variables undoubt-
edly may suffer endogeneity bias. Take the 
unemployment spell: not only may longer 
spell press the reservation wage downward, 
but also high reservation wage may keep 
the unemployed persons out of a job longer. 
Hence, our estimates will be interpreted 
only in terms of relationships, rather than 
effects, though still concomitant with the 
objectives of the study.
In the second part of the analysis, we 
would like to provide estimates of the reser-
vation wage gaps (premiums or discounts) 
existing in the Macedonian labor market. 
Namely, reservation wage may be indeed 
a stumbling block to (first) employment, if 
set very high, especially because the person 
does not have a full grasp of the potential 
of the local labor market. Or, contrary to 
that, people may be guided by the market 
wages of people in their surroundings, dis-
counting the importance of their specific 
circumstances determined by their observed 
and unobserved traits. There is a third case 
in North Macedonia, whereby public ser-
vice jobs have a wage premium of at least 
10%, which together with the perception 
that such a job is easier to perform, created 
a widespread wish for employment in the 
public administration. Hence, the reserva-
tion wage is being formed also taking this 
into account.
To estimate the reservation wage premi-
um, we apply three procedures. In the first 
one, we compare unemployed individuals 
with their employed peers. We do this by 
applying propensity score matching, i.e. by 
comparing the average reservation wage of 
unemployed persons with the average mar-
ket wage of employed persons similar in a 
few observable characteristics: gender, age, 
education and field of the studies. The pre-
dictions obtained in a probit model are used 
as scores to find as close as possible peers 
and then to compare them. In a similar fash-
ion, in the second procedure, we predict the 
possible market wages of the unemployed, 
based on their observable characteristics 
and using information from Heckman-style 
coefficients obtained on employed individ-
uals. The predicted market wage is com-
pared with the observed reservation wage 
and the gap is calculated. In the third proce-
dure, we compare unemployed individuals 
with themselves had they been employed in 
the past or in the future compared to the date 
when they reported a reservation wage. The 
disadvantage of doing this is that we drop 
from the analysis all unemployed persons 
who did not have any market wage during 
the time horizon of our analysis (which is 
anyway short). If those dropped are system-
atically different from those who stayed in 
the sample, then the obtained results would 
be biased. The advantage, however, is that 
the ‘matching’ is perfect, i.e. we compare 
each person with themselves, which would 
imply matching on both observables and 
unobservables; in contrast, the propensi-
ty score matching does it on observables 
only. In the third procedure, the reserva-
tion wage gap is calculated both backward 
(i.e. when the person was unemployed and 
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then got employed) and forward (i.e. when 
the person was employed and then became 
jobless). By so doing, we would be able to 
qualitatively judge if having employment 
acted as a learning mechanism of the mar-
ket conditions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
What determines reservation wages 
in North Macedonia?
The first contingent of results we ana-
lyze is the determinants of reservation wag-
es in North Macedonia. They are presented 
in Table 3. The table is organized so that 
it adds the independent variables group by 
group. The complete economic model is 
estimated in column (5). Then, columns (6)-
(8) divide by education level. The adding 
of independent factors group by group is 
important because some of them may refer 
to similar personal or household facets, as 
well because of measuring the same char-
acteristic from the supply and demand side.
Females have lower reservation wages 
than men, by 7-8%, on average. The gender 
reservation wage gap is most pronounced 
among the low-skilled and then declines 
with education. Reservation wage reduces 
with age, by 0.2% per annum, reflecting a 
combination of depreciated human capital, 
lost motivation and hopes, learning about 
market conditions and so on. Most notably, 
hope and self-appreciation is most rapid-
ly lost among tertiary educated. Marriage 
implies higher reservation wage by about 
2.5%, though by more and only among low-
skilled. The number of children matters as 
well: additional children in the household 
increase reservation wage by about 1.2%. 
As both marriage and the number of chil-
dren may be used as a proxy for the search-
ing costs, they imply that the increase of 
search cost works positively on the reser-
vation wage.
The return to education is found signif-
icant, both statistically and economically, 
for the reservation wage. The completion 
of secondary education is related to about 
7% higher reservation wage, compared to 
complete or incomplete primary education. 
On the other hand, the role of tertiary edu-
cation is overwhelming and persistent: in-
dividuals with completed tertiary education 
have 32% higher expected wage compared 
to primary-educated ones, being a 25% pre-
mium over those with secondary education. 
The inclusion of other explanatory variables 
apparently attenuates the role of education. 
The result may be driven by the more fa-
vorable employment opportunities for ter-
tiary educated, but also due to the long-last-
ing policies of the 2006-2017 government 
based on proliferation of the access to (not 
necessarily the quality of) higher educa-
tion and the awareness-raising campaigns 
“Knowledge is power” which resulted in 
massive enrollment at universities.
The unemployment benefits work dis-
paragingly for reservation wage: persons 
who receive them have a higher reservation 
wage, on average, than people who do not 
receive it, by about 2%. This is most prev-
alent among low-skilled workers, while 
it does not exist for the high-skilled ones. 
The longer a person is without a job, the 
lower the reservation wage, again concom-
itant to the searching costs: a year longer 
in unemployment reduces the reservation 
wage by 0.2%. The effect vanishes for the 
highly-skilled. However, one should note 
that due to potential reverse causality, this 
coefficient may be attenuated. As searching 
costs are captured in the model imprecisely, 
through both marriage/children variables 
and the unemployment spell variable, it is 
important to note that the inclusion of the 
latter in the model does not change previous 
conclusions, pointing to the model’s robust-
ness. Finally, households’ welfare works 
positively for the reservation wage forma-
180





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rev. soc. polit., god. 27, br.2, str. 171-192, Zagreb 2020.
181
Petreski M., Oviedo A. M., Cancho C. A.: Expectations Set High:...
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rev. soc. polit., god. 27, br.2, str. 171-192, Zagreb 2020. Petreski M., Oviedo A. M., Cancho C. A.: Expectations Set High:...
tion: when household income increases by 
10%, the reservation wage increases by 0.4-
0.5%, on average. The result vanishes for 
low-skilled individuals, likely reflecting the 
correlation between the level of education 
and the household income.
The sources of livelihood generally 
matter for the reservation wage creation. 
Particularly, persons living in a household 
who are recipients of remittances from a 
relative who is not a member of the house-
hold, have higher reservation wage by 4-5% 
compared to a person relying on the wages 
and pensions of other household member. 
Apparently, remittances expand the comfort 
zones for recipients, as has been also found 
in a recent study of Petreski (2019). How-
ever, remittances’ role for the reservation 
wage is important only for the mid-skilled 
individuals. Interestingly, social assistance 
is negatively related to reservation wage. 
It could be that social-assistance recipi-
ents, who are already on the lowest part 
of the income spectrum have low expec-
tation about wages, which may also be a 
reflection of their specific circumstances 
and endowment with some characteristics 
which have not been already captured by 
the other variables. The result appears for 
low-skilled individuals only, reflecting their 
higher probability to be low-educated. Yet, 
we should note that the negative coeffi-
cient on social assistance recipients may 
well be reflecting the insufficiently-proper 
targeting of the benefits, as discussed in 
Petreski and Mojsoska-Blazevski (2017). 
Likewise, with the opposite sign, capital 
income works positively: these are usual-
ly households well-endowed with various 
assets, positioning them on the high part of 
the income spectrum. The addition of the 
sources of livelihood for the unemployed 
persons does not alter any previous result, 
especially given that sources may capture 
related variation with household welfare.
Education fields are generally insignifi-
cant for the reference-wage differentiation, 
though with some exceptions. The reference 
category is ‘general education and servic-
es’. Social sciences impose a reservation 
wage premium by 4.2%, yet the result 
vanishes when demand factors enter the 
regression. On the other hand, health care 
professionals expect a wage that is 11.1% 
higher than the reference category. The 
other profiles do not have a distinct wage 
expectation. However, a more robust pic-
ture is obtained when looking by the level 
of education, especially given the fact that 
primary school completion is not associ-
ated with different fields (i.e. all persons 
with at most primary education are classi-
fied under ‘general education’). A degree in 
health inflates the reservation wage at the 
tertiary level. However, the latter should be 
observed against the international compet-
itiveness of such profiles and their propen-
sity to emigrate to Western Europe.
Finally, the two variables capturing de-
mand – the skill- and field-specific employ-
ment rate – suggest that the role of demand 
is subdued, if at all present. 
In conclusion, there are few factors 
which potentially work for inflating res-
ervation wages in North Macedonia. Most 
notably, higher education attainment siz-
ably increases future wage expectations, 
especially when persons are younger and 
with short unemployment spells, hence 
with lower probability of having past work 
experience. While demand is found not to 
matter for reservation wage formation, it 
could only mean that demand conditions 
are not taken into account in the process, 
leading to a dangerous gap between ex-
pectations and what the market could re-
ally offer. The condition is aggravated in 
cases where the household is well-off and/
or receives remittances. On the other hand, 
however, longer spells and low household 
welfare – including the cases of social as-
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sistance receipt – depress the reservation 
wage, suggesting a potentially precarious 
vicious cycle of skills – household welfare 
– reservation wage.
Reservation wage gap
The previous section provided the 
grounds for understanding what shapes res-
ervation wages in North Macedonia. It still 
does not provide a meaningful guidance on 
how large the problem is, i.e. how distant 
expectations from reality are. To pursue the 
second objective of this paper, we compare 
reservation wages with market ones. To do 
this in a methodologically-grounded man-
ner, we conduct three types of comparisons. 
In the first comparison, we match unem-
ployed individuals with likewise employed 
ones, based on a score similarity.1 The score 
is obtained from a probit function whereby 
age, gender, education and field of the edu-
cational profile are used. The probit results 
are presented in Annex 2. The reservation 
wage gap, after matching between indi-
viduals, is presented in Table 4 for a few 
matching alternatives. Results robustly sug-
gest that the reservation wage gap in North 
Macedonia is positive and hovers around 
13-15% of the market wage. This finding is 
in stark contrast with our raw observations, 
however it suggests that consideration of 
personal characteristics – which lead to 
estimating an ‘adjusted’ reservation wage 
gap – plays an important role for reserva-
tion wage creation and is potentially more 
than or exclusively important compared to 
labor-market conditions (as found in Ta-
ble 3 also).
Table 4 
Cross-section (between-person) reservation wage gap (%)
Matching options





Entire sample 15.66*** 15.64*** 13.58*** 12.76*** 13.41***
By education
Primary 22.52*** 22.53*** 20.61*** 18.51*** 20.95***
Secondary 14.74*** 14.84*** 11.70*** 9.60*** 11.87***
Tertiary 9.00*** 9.09*** 7.73*** 6.15*** 7.83***
By field
General programs 20.48*** 20.38*** 17.18*** 14.75*** 17.17***
Humanities and arts 9.19* 9.27* 7.81*** 5.45*** 11.80***
Social sciences 14.10*** 13.93*** 10.68*** 8.56*** 9.00***
STEM 8.35* 8.25* 9.34*** 8.21*** 8.65***
Agriculture 21.81*** 22.34*** 17.10*** 12.50*** 17.57***
Health care 11.46* 10.52* 12.20*** 11.37*** 10.94***
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Population 
weights accordingly used.
1  The comparison of unemployed individuals for whom the market wage is unobserved and employed 
individuals whose market wage is known, on observable characteristics, suggests that both groups are diffe-
rent in terms of the latter. The Hotelling test that the vectors of means are equal for the two groups results in an 
F-value of 260 and p-value of 0.000, providing evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
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The reservation wage gap declines with 
education, though persisting at 7-9% at the 
tertiary-education level and being as high 
as 22% at the primary-education level. The 
declining reservation wage gap with educa-
tion may be also related to the increased ca-
pacity for learning and access to market in-
formation with education. Hence, although 
we concluded that the reservation wage 
increases with education, the declining gap 
suggests that wage expectations rise with 
education in a similar manner as market 
wage. However, such increase is faster for 
expectations than for actual market wages, 
resulting in a persistent reservation wage 
gap even at the tertiary level.
The analysis by field of education sug-
gests persistent reservation wage gaps 
across all fields. In particular, the reserva-
tion wage gap is high for general programs 
and agriculture, as a major part of prima-
ry-educated individuals belong to these 
fields. The rest of the fields face an 8-10% 
gap, without any statistically significant 
difference among them.
In the second comparison, we com-
pare the reported reservation wage of un-
employed individuals with their potential 
market wage. The latter is not observed, 
as they are unemployed. We rely on the 
approach of Prasad (2003) and use predic-
tions for the market wages, based on the 
observed ones of employed individuals. 
We first run a Heckman-type (1976; 1979) 
two-stage Mincerian function to be able to 
predict market wages based on observable 
human-capital characteristics, accounting 
for the selectivity bias. The Mincer-equa-
tion results, corrected for selectivity, are 
provided in Annex 3. 
The findings about the declining reser-
vation wage gap are largely corroborated. 
Figure 5 plots the reservation wage gap 
against the potential market wage, which 
could be considered a conceptual measure 
of skills endowment. There is a clear neg-
ative relationship between the gap and the 
skill level. For the highly-skilled individu-
als, the reservation wage gap is prevalently 
negative. For these individuals, the value of 
employment may be high enough so that 
their propensity to accept jobs even below 
their reservation wage is high. This could 
be related to the value they assign to their 
investment in higher education and the (fear 
of) accelerated depreciation of their human 
capital, but also to the greater understand-
ing of market potential. By contrast, for a 
large fraction of low-skilled individuals, 
reservation wages are significantly over the 
potential market wage, presenting an obsta-
cle for low-skilled individuals into finding 
and accepting a job.
In the third comparison, we compare 
individuals who, over the observed period, 
have had both employment and unemploy-
ment experiences, so that for them both 
market and reservation wage are available 
over a fairly short period of time. In such 
case, panel structure could be imposed; 
the utilization of fixed effects wipes out all 
unobservable factors which are potentially 
correlated with the reservation wage. The 
disadvantage is that we drop all unem-
ployed individuals without employment 
experience over the observed period and 
those who appear only once in our sam-
ple, which reduces our sample to a quarter 
(see Table 1), which may unquestionably 
inflict selection bias. From this viewpoint, 
results should be approached with caution. 
However, this is the only point where we 
could make use of the anyway scant tem-
poral information. We assume asymme-
try in the reservation wage gap, i.e. in the 
reservation wage formation depending on 
whether it follows or precedes the earning 
of the market wage. 
Results are provided in Table 5. The 
first thing to note is that we obtain higher 
reservation wage gap compared to the be-
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Figure 5  
Reservation wage and predicted market wage  
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Low-skilled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> High-skilled
Figure 5 
Reservation wage and predicted market wage 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
tween-case in Table 4. This may actually 
suggest that i) persons who have had any 
work experience may be systematically 
different than the entire cohort of unem-
ployed (e.g. live in considerable shortage 
of living funds); and/or ii) unobservable 
factors (e.g. higher motivation to search 
intensively) – which are not accounted for 
in the between-variation calculation – may 
have played an important role. This point 
remains a challenge for future work. Our 
focus, however, in Table 5 is on another 
important aspect: individuals generally re-
duce their wage expectations only by about 
2 percentage points, after an experience of 
employment. Nevertheless, the reserva-
tion wage gap remains high and persistent 
even after the person learned about market 
conditions through their own experience. 
It may suggest that many job seekers per-
sistently misjudge their prospects or anchor 
their reservation wage on their beliefs rath-
er than on the previous wage. The finding 
may not be surprising for North Macedonia, 
given the prevalence of underemployment: 
for instance, Petreski and Davalos (2019) 
find that 57.1% of youth (15-29) in North 
Macedonia reported that at least two of the 
following underemployment conditions on 
the workplace prevailed: the person worked 
less than 35 hours per week though wanted 
to work more, the person had been over-
qualified, the person expressed insecurity 
on the job; persons’ salary had been below 
the reservation wage; and the person had 
temporary or no written contract. Hence, 
persons who faced such conditions of em-
ployment in the past, likely retain their 
high reservation wage, despite the sluggish 
downward adjustment.
186
Rev. soc. polit., god. 27, br.2, str. 171-192, Zagreb 2020. Petreski M., Oviedo A. M., Cancho C. A.: Expectations Set High:...
Table 5 






wage gap after 
employment










Social sciences 26.4*** 25.5***
STEM 19.4*** 15.8***
Agriculture 30.5** 9.95
Health care 37.0*** 10.2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Fixed 
effects accordingly used. Population weights 
accordingly used.
Observed by education, the high res-
ervation wage is persisting at all levels, 
though the downward adjustment is faster 
at lower levels of education. This likely 
reflects the learning benefit for this group, 
corroborating the notions of Burdett and 
Vishwanath (1988) who argue that the se-
lection process informs job seekers about 
market conditions over time. While there 
is no adjustment at the other two levels, 
corroborating our previous discussion on 
underemployment, which is more impor-
tant at a higher level of skills. This is fur-
ther confirmed when results are observed 
by field: large downward adjustment is 
observed in general programs and agri-
culture, as they largely correlate with low 
skills. Interestingly, downward adjustment 
is present in science, technology and engi-
neering, while there is an upward adjust-
ment in humanities. 
In conclusion, the reservation wage 
gap in North Macedonia is persistent and 
statistically significant. In cross-individual 
context, it is about 13% of the market wage, 
corroborating the notion that it represents 
a binding constraint for people to search 
for and accept a job. However, the gap – 
as opposed to the level – of the reservation 
wage declines with education, suggesting 
that reservation wage rises with education, 
but learning and information-spreading 
mechanisms are more effective for low-
skilled individuals to better align their ex-
pectations with reality. Still, persons who 
experienced periods of both unemploy-
ment and employment generally maintain 
a high reservation wage, with a somewhat 
downward adjustment reflecting the learn-
ing experience. This is especially true for 
lower-skilled individuals.
CONCLUSION
This study explores, for the first time, 
the nature of reservation wages in North 
Macedonia, by taking advantage of newly 
collected information from the Labor Force 
Survey 2016 and 2017. Given the fairly 
scant information on reservation wages, we 
mainly use it in a pooled cross-section con-
text, while being aware of the limitations it 
imposes onto our conclusions. However, a 
number of interesting observations emerge, 
that suggest avenues for future research.
Results suggest that it is mainly supply 
factors that shape reservation wages in the 
country. That is, higher education sizably 
increases future wage expectations, espe-
cially when persons are younger and with 
short unemployment spells, hence with 
lower probability of having past work expe-
rience. Furthermore, the reservation wage 
declines with age and with longer spells of 
unemployment. On the other hand, the in-
significance of demand factors for reserva-
tion wage formation may suggest that job 
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seekers either lack information about local 
conditions, or – more importantly – they 
are reluctant to fast accommodate, consid-
ering them substandard. The latter espe-
cially applies to low-skilled individuals, 
who consistently value their skills higher 
than what the market offers and who set too 
high expectations. These circumstances are 
aggravated in cases where the household 
is well-off and/or receives remittances. On 
the other hand, highly skilled individuals, 
despite maintaining a positive reservation 
wage gap, have a propensity to accept mar-
ket wages even when they fall below their 
reservation wage. It is likely that hope 
and self-appreciation are most rapidly lost 
among the tertiary educated.
The findings of this study, combined 
with expanded future research, may be use-
ful for policy makers in several ways. For 
example, the study disputes the widespread 
perception that reservation wages are only 
binding for high-skilled individuals and 
confirms this is also true for low-skilled 
individuals. The former are more likely to 
fear the accelerated depletion of their hu-
man capital and agree to work for a lower 
wage than their reservation wage. The lat-
ter are likely to persistently misjudge their 
prospects or anchor their reservation wage 
on their beliefs rather than on the observed 
wage. Therefore, increasing labor mar-
ket information is more relevant for low-
er-skilled individuals. Still, the mechanism 
for the highly-skilled should be further ex-
plored, especially in the context of the skill 
mismatches, accelerated emigration and the 
constant complaint – made by employers – 
that it is hard to find workers in the country.
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The logarithm of the wage self-reported as the level below 
which the respondent would not accept a job offer, per assumed 
work hour of a standard working week. The variable is observed 
only for unemployed persons.
Log market wage
The logarithm of the wage the respondent received at the time 
of the interview, per actual work hour. The variable is observed 
only for unemployed persons.
Female 1 if persons is women, 0 otherwise
Age Age expressed in years
Married 1 if persons is married, 0 otherwise
Number of children Number of children living in the household 
Education Three dummy variables for primary, secondary and tertiary education. Primary is the reference category.
Recipient of unemployment benefits 1 if the person received state unemployment compensation in the 4 weeks preceding the interview, 0 otherwise
Unemployment spell duration The period, expressed in years, that elapsed since the last time the person was employed.
Log of household’s welfare
Calculated variable, based on coefficients obtained from SILC. 
Note that LFS does not contain data on income except for 
wages. The following equation was used: Log of household’s 
welfare = 0.151*Log of the wage per hour + 0.237*Average 
education level in the household  + 0.022*Average age in the 
household -0.057*Number of children in the household + 6.81
Sources of livelihood
Five dummy variables created for the following sources: wages/
pensions of others, remittances, social assistance, capital 
income and other income. Wages/pensions of others are the 
reference category.
Field of studies completed
Six dummy variables created for the following fields: general 
programs, humanities and arts, social sciences, STEM, 
agriculture and health care. General programs used as the 
reference category.
Skill-specific employment rate The employment rate by skill by period.
Field-specific employment rate The employment rate by field by period.
Urban 1 if the person is residing in urban area, 0 otherwise.
Source: Labor Force Survey.
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Annex 2  
Propensity Score Matching 





























Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors provided in parentheses. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Population weights accordingly used.
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Annex 3   
Mincerian earnings function estimated with the Heckman method
Outcome equation Selection equation







































Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity. Population weights accordingly used.
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Sažetak
VISOKO POSTAVLJENJA OČEKIVANJA: RAZUMIJEVANJE UVJETNIH 
NADNICA U SJEVERNOJ MAKEDONIJI
Marjan Petreski
University American College Skopje
Skopje, North Macedonia
Ana María Oviedo, Cesar Alfredo Cancho
The World Bank
Ciljevi ovoga rada su analizirati odrednice visina uvjetnih nadnica nezaposlenih i 
izmjeriti jaz između uvjetnih nadnica nezaposlenih i plaća na tržištu rada u Sjevernoj 
Makedoniji. U radu se koriste nedavno prikupljeni podatci o uvjetnim nadnicama iz An-
kete o radnoj snazi iz 2016. i 2017. godine. Analiza se oslanja na metodu običnih najman-
jih kvadrata, tehniku uparivanja prema sklonosti, Heckmanovu korekciju i model fiksnih 
efekata na panel podatcima. Rezultati sugeriraju da čimbenici ponude uglavnom oblikuju 
uvjetne nadnice u zemlji. Viša razina obrazovanja znatno povećava očekivanja vezana uz 
buduće plaće, dok ih dob  i duže razdoblje nezaposlenosti umanjuju. Čimbenici potražn-
jenisu značajni za formiranje uvjetne nadnice. Prema razini kvalifikacija, rezultati pokazu-
ju da pojedinci s nižim kvalifikacijama dosljedno precjenjuju svoje kvalifikacije u odnosu 
na ono što se nudi na tržištu i imaju previsoka očekivanja. Te okolnosti povećavaju se u 
slučajevima u kojima je kućanstvo dobrostojeće i/ili prima uplate. S druge strane, usprkos 
tome što održavaju pozitivnu uvjetnu nadnicu, osobe s visokim kvalifikacijama sklone su 
prihvatiti plaće na tržištu rada čak i onda kada su te plaće niže od njihove uvjetne nadnice, 
vjerojatno zato što se takvi radnici boje brze deprecijacije svojih kvalifikacija.
Ključne riječi: uvjetna plaća, tržišna plaća, odrednice, Sjeverna Makedonija.
